Counterinsurgency Field Manual: With foreword by General David H. Petraeus...

When the U.S. military invaded Iraq in 2003, it lacked a shared understanding of counterinsurgency problems and had not developed doctrine or tactics to address them. Most Army officers at that time were more familiar with the U.S. Civil War than with counterinsurgency operations. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual was created to address this gap. Developed through collaboration among top military experts, scholars, and practitioners, the manual presents an approach emphasizing constant adaptation and learning, decentralized decision-making, understanding of local politics and customs, and the role of intelligence in gaining population support. The manual highlights counterintuitive aspects of counterinsurgency: increased force protection can reduce security; greater use of force may decrease effectiveness; inaction can sometimes be the best response. Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, provides a new introduction that places the manual in critical and historical context. The University of Chicago Press donates a portion of proceeds to the Fisher House Foundation, which supports families of injured servicemen.